“Ransom Republic: Broader implications for insecurity management are grave. Persistent denials risk incentivising further abductions if payments are indeed made. Opacity hampers oversight and accountability.”
In the shadowed operational theatres of Nigeria’s north-west and north-central regions, a disturbing pattern has emerged under the current administration.
The abduction of schoolchildren from Kebbi State’s Government Girls’ Comprehensive Secondary School in Maga on 18 November 2025, followed swiftly by the mass kidnapping at St Mary’s Catholic School in Papiri, Niger State, on 21 November, exemplifies a calculated exploitation of vulnerabilities by non-state actors.
In both instances, the Federal Government issued categorical denials of any ransom disbursements, asserting that the releases were secured through unspecified operational prowess.
The French news agency, Agence France-Presse (AFP), subsequently alleged substantial payments, ranging from ₦2 billion to ₦10 billion, for the Niger captives, coupled with the purported exchange of militant commanders. These claims cast a pall over official denials.
This analysis dissects the incongruities, probing the terrorists’ financial imperatives, the absence of kinetic engagements, and the eroding credibility of key officials in President Bola Tinubu’s administration. It posits that the stewardship of the National Security Adviser (NSA), Nuhu Ribadu, represents a critical shortfall in capacity, warranting urgent an reassessment to avert further strategic erosion.
The Kebbi incident unfolded with the precision typical of bandit syndicates operating in porous borderlands. Armed assailants infiltrated the Maga school under cover of darkness, abducting 25 girls after neutralising two security personnel. One victim escaped shortly thereafter, but the remaining 24 were held for over a week.
Upon their release, Kebbi State Governor Nasir Idris and federal spokespersons uniformly proclaimed that no ransom had been tendered, attributing the outcome to coordinated intelligence and pressure from joint task forces.
This narrative aligns with the administration’s doctrinal stance against concessions, enshrined in the 2022 amendment to the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, which criminalises such payments with penalties of up to 15 years’ imprisonment. Yet the absence of verifiable after-action reports detailing arrests, neutralisations, or recovered assets invites scrutiny.
If no financial incentive was yielded, what compelled the captors to relinquish their leverage? Bandit groups, often fragmented alliances of Fulani herders and opportunistic criminals, sustain their campaigns through extortion; voluntary releases defy their economic model.
Three days later, the Papiri assault escalated the threat matrix. Over 300 pupils and 12 staff were seized from the Catholic institution in a brazen operation conducted amid heightened alerts following the Kebbi breach. Initial escapes reduced the captive count to approximately 230, with phased liberations announced on 100 on the 7 December and the remainder by the 21st.
Again, the government invoked non-monetary negotiations, crediting NSA Ribadu’s direct involvement. Ribadu publicly characterised ransom as “one of the worst things” fuelling insecurity, insisting on both kinetic and non-kinetic strategies to dismantle insurgent networks.
However, AFP’s investigative dispatch, citing multiple intelligence sources, alleged a clandestine payout delivered, via helicopter, to Boko Haram commander Ali Ngulde in Gwoza, Borno State, a jihadist stronghold.
Estimates varied: ₦40 million per head, totalling around $7 million, or a lump sum exceeding ₦2 billion, supplemented by the release of two high-value detainees. The rebuttal by the Ministry of Information, labelling these assertions “baseless” and a “disservice” to security forces, failed to address the granularity of the claims or furnish counter-evidence.
This duality of official denial juxtaposed with credible external reportage mirrors a historical continuum in Nigerian security discourse.
Preceding the Tinubu era, the 2020 Kankara abduction of 344 schoolboys in Katsina State elicited similar protestations from the then Governor Aminu Masari and federal authorities, who denied ransoms despite bandit confessions and journalistic exposés revealing ₦30 million transfers.
The 2021 Kagara incident in Niger State followed suit: 27 students and staff were freed amid government assertions of no payments, yet survivors recounted negotiations implying concessions.
Under the Muhammadu Buhari administration, such episodes proliferated Jangebe (279 girls, Zamfara, 2021), Tegina (136 pupils, Niger, 2021) with consistent denials belying reports of multimillion-naira settlements.
Even the Chibok saga, commencing in 2014, saw phased releases in 2016-2017 attributed to prisoner swaps, though ransoms were obliquely acknowledged in diplomatic cables.
The Tinubu administration appears to perpetuate this template, as evidenced by the Kwara church abductions contemporaneous with Papiri, where denials accompanied swift resolutions absent reported firefights.
At the core of this interrogation lies the primary motive of the perpetrators: pecuniary gain. Terrorist and bandit entities in Nigeria’s ungoverned spaces operate as profit-driven enterprises, leveraging abductions to fund armament, recruitment, and territorial control. Boko Haram’s ideological veneer notwithstanding, its forays into mass kidnappings prioritise ransom extraction. Bandits in the North-West, devoid of such pretences, demand payments in the millions per victim, often escalating to livestock or motorcycles as proxies.
The notion that these actors would abandon captives without remuneration, allowing security operatives to retrieve them unopposed, strains operational logic. Such scenarios imply either capitulation unlikely given their asymmetric advantages or an unpublicised accord. Absent evidence of defections, surrenders, or ideological shifts, financial inducement remains the most plausible catalyst.
Compounding this improbability is the conspicuous absence of kinetic confrontations in these resolutions. In a theatre where insurgents possess superior local intelligence and mobility, forcible extractions typically entail engagements, ambushes, firefights, or aerial bombardments.
Yet in Kebbi, Niger, and analogous cases, no casualties among perpetrators, rescuers, or hostages have been documented. If gun battles secured freedom, collateral damage would be expected. The pristine outcomes — intact victims and no recorded losses — suggest negotiated pathways rather than decisive martial triumphs.
The credibility deficit extends to senior officials in the Tinubu administration, whose pronouncements on security increasingly diverge from empirical realities. President Tinubu pledged security as paramount in his inaugural address, yet abductions have surged. Claims of reduced terrorist attacks clash with persistent violence in Borno, Kaduna, and Plateau States, where jihadists and bandits maintain enclaves.
On security, denials of ransom payments echo prior patterns where settlements were later corroborated by survivors and intermediaries. Why should the public privilege governmental assertions over AFP’s sourced intelligence? The latter aligns with historical precedents; the former lacks transparent substantiation. This asymmetry erodes institutional trust, undermining intelligence-sharing from communities vital to counter-insurgency efforts.
Central to these failings is NSA Ribadu’s tenure, marked by perceived strategic oversights and operational inertia. His anti-corruption pedigree notwithstanding, security management demands specialised intelligence integration and military synchronisation. Preventive failures preceding the Kebbi–Niger cascade raise questions about surveillance efficacy and border control. While presidential commendations cite procurements and joint operations, empirical metrics suggest persistent instability.
Broader implications for insecurity management are grave. Persistent denials risk incentivising further abductions if payments are indeed made. Opacity hampers oversight and accountability. Governance deficits, poverty, porous borders, weak rural policing exacerbate root causes. International partners increasingly question Nigeria’s strategic coherence.
In summation, the Kebbi and Niger episodes, contextualised against historical denials, reveal a troubling pattern of contradiction. Terrorists’ financial motives, the absence of documented engagements, and official inconsistencies demand transparency. Declassification of negotiation frameworks, audit of release protocols, and visible prosecution of enablers would restore confidence. The public, besieged by insecurity, deserves candour over concealment and demonstrable control over declaratory assurances.
•Aduwo is the Permanent Representative of the Centre for Convention on Democratic Integrity (CCDI) to the ECOSOC/United Nations. CCDI is a non-profit organisation with the Consultative Status of the United Nations.
